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1 Introduction
At the heart of interregional risk sharing stand the fundamental di¤erences between re-
gional Gross Domestic Product (GDP), income, disposable income, and consumption.
While GDP corresponds to a regions production, income explicitly includes net factor
payments from other regions. By holding claims to output in other regions, individuals
can smooth away idiosyncratic shocks to income caused by variations in their home regions
production. Following Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (henceforth ASY) such in-
surance is referred to as income smoothingor capital market smoothing. As discussed
by ASY (1996) and von Hagen (2000), in a world with imperfect capital markets, further
smoothing of incomes can be achieved by the scal transfer system, which renders dispos-
able income di¤erent from income. This channel of risk sharing is referred to as federal
government smoothing. In the extreme case of full risk sharing after capital market and
federal government smoothing, idiosyncratic shocks to production do not a¤ect disposable
income at all. The desirable e¤ect of this stabilization is that regions can achieve a smooth
stream of intertemporal consumption.1
In most economies, scal transfers are not primarily intended to provide short-term
risk sharing. Although scal transfers may turn out to have stabilizing e¤ects, the main
justication of transfers is to provide systematic and long-term redistribution from persis-
tently rich to persistently poor regions. This is made explicit in the German constitution,
which states that the main goal of the scal transfer system is to create and secure uniform
living standards throughout Germany. In general, any persistent disparities in levels of
relative economic prosperity may result from di¤erent shocks but also from permanent
heterogeneity among regions.
Similar to the smoothing of output shocks by private markets, the smoothing of persis-
tent initial disparities by scal redistribution can also be interpreted as a kind of insurance.
Rather than providing insurance against shocks, this kind of risk sharing refers to an in-
surance against unfavorable initial conditions. It is an insurance in a Rawlsian sense, an
insurance taken behind a veil of ignorance. Behind a veil of ignorance, individuals could
be born in a rich as well as poor region. In the absence of sizeable regional migration, the
risk of being born in a poor region can be insured against by redistribution of income by
public institutions. The market, by contrast, is not expected to provide su¢ cient insurance
against unfavorable initial conditions.
This implies that one has to distinguish between two kinds of risk sharing: Firstly,
1A region can further smooth its consumption by borrowing and lending on the credit market. Since
consumption data are not available at the disaggregated regional level used in this paper, such ex post
channel of consumption smoothingor credit market smoothing(see ASY, 1996 and Becker and Ho¤mann,
2006) is not considered.
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private markets and the public sector provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks to
regional output. Secondly, the public sector aims at reducing level disparities between re-
gions which may result from permanent heterogeneity rather than from short-term shocks.
This paper provides new empirical evidence on both kinds of risk sharing in reunied
Germany. One novelty of our study is that it introduces new empirical techniques into
the risk sharing literature which rely on nonparametric density estimation. The short
term and stabilizing e¤ect of interregional risk sharing is analyzed by conditioning the
densities of rst-di¤erenced income and disposable income on shocks to regional output.
This conditioning allows one to assess if shocks to production are transmitted to shocks to
income and disposable income. An advantage of the proposed methodology is that one can
address the question of whether the relationship between the di¤erent risk sharing channels
and idiosyncratic output shocks is more complex than captured by a linear regression model
as proposed by ASY (1996). For example, a nonparametric approach may turn out to be
useful if high risks are harder to insure than moderate risks.
In order to analyze if redistribution of the public sector contributes to a reduction of
level disparities between regions, we adopt a continuous state space method to estimate the
transition dynamics and calculate the implied long-run distributions of regional output,
income, and disposable income. By comparing the shapes of the long-run distributions
we can assess the extent of smoothing of disparities between regions achieved by private
factor income ows and public interregional transfers.
The techniques employed are borrowed from the growth econometrics literature and
were rst introduced by Danny Quah in a number of seminal papers to analyze convergence
between countries and regions (Quah, 1996a, b, c, 1997, 2001). This so called distribution
dynamicsapproach facilitates an analysis of evolving distributions which extends panel
data and time-series methods and is especially useful in uncovering empirical phenomena
like clumping, stratication, and polarization. As already pointed out by Quah himself
(Quah 1996c, p. 117), risk sharing is one example where these phenomena are relevant.
Surprisingly, the techniques from the growth econometrics literature have not been trans-
ferred yet to a risk sharing framework. Our study is the rst assigning Quahs ideas to
the risk sharing literature by explicitly distinguishing between the distribution dynamics
of output, income, and disposable income.
While previous studies for (West) Germany have examined regional risk sharing at the
level of the West German federal states (Hepp and von Hagen, 2000, Kellermann, 2001,
Buettner, 2002), our study provides a regionally disaggregated analysis at the level of 271
functionally dened labor market regions. For reunied Germany, ours is the rst study an-
alyzing interregional risk sharing, most likely because appropriate data have only recently
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become available. The case for reunied Germany is particularly interesting because there
are substantial interregional transfers aimed at reducing regional disparities, especially be-
tween the Eastern and Western part of the country. These transfers potentially provide
insurance of idiosyncratic regional risk.2
Before we proceed to present the data and the econometric model, we provide a preview
of our results. The results of the short-term risk sharing analysis are surprisingly clear-
cut: Shocks to regional output are found to be almost uncorrelated to changes in regional
income, a nding which provides strong evidence of almost complete risk sharing after
income smoothing. The fact that regional income does not co-move with output implies
that there is no scope for further smoothing of income shocks by the federal government.
Indeed, the estimation results show that scal transfers, which are responsible for the wedge
between income and disposable income, provide no additional insurance of idiosyncratic
shocks.
Concerning the long-term redistributive properties of scal transfers we nd that the
variance reduction achieved by the scal transfer system is substantial. In the long run,
the probability that German regions deviate from the average level of disposable income
per capita is comparatively low. Since redistribution by the public sector is necessary to
achieve a uni-modal distribution of regional incomes, we conclude that the scal transfer
system reduces disparities between regions signicantly. However, this redistributive policy
has no short-term stabilizing e¤ects as a by-product.
This paper is structured as follows: The data are introduced in Section 2. Section 3
focuses on the short-term stabilizing e¤ects of interregional risk sharing. The distribution
dynamics analysis of long-term disparities between regions is presented in Section 4. A
brief discussion of our empirical approach is presented in Section 5. The last section
presents our conclusions.
2 Data
In order to gain an understanding of regional risk sharing it is necessary to measure the
regional macroeconomies carefully. Recently, detailed data for reunied Germany have
become available, which facilitate a regionally disaggregated analysis at the level of 439
counties. The institution for measuring the countieseconomic activity is the National Ac-
counts of the Federal States compiled by the Statistical State O¢ ce Baden-Wuerttemberg.
Our analysis of interregional risk sharing takes data on GDP, (primary) income, and dis-
2 In Germany, there is an explicit, formula-based arrangement for tax revenue sharing and transfers
among German federal states which is dened by the German constitution. Moreover, there are separate
arrangements for scal equalization at the municipal level in all federal states (Hepp and von Hagen, 2000).
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posable income into account.3
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is measured in market prices and quanties the amount
of economic production of a particular region. In contrast to Gross National Product
(GNP), GDP excludes interregional income transfers and hence attributes to a region the
products generated within it, rather than the incomes received in it.
The income gure used in this study is the so-called primary income of private house-
holds.4 It consists of the received compensation of employees, the incomes of the self-
employed, and property income, e.g. interest on wealth. In contrast to GDP, primary
income includes net factor payments (interregional income transfers) from other regions.
A priori, the di¤erence between regional GDP and income can be expected to be substantial
because regions within a country are highly integrated.
Disposable income is dened as the amount of householdstotal income left after taxes,
plus any transfer payments and grants received from the federal government. We denote
the overall balance of levied taxes (e.g. income tax), contributions (e.g. social insurance
contributions) and received transfers (e.g. pensions, unemployment benets, social welfare)
as net scal transfer. Disposable income is obtained from primary income by substracting
the net scal transfer.5 This income gure determines how much private households can
consume and save and it is often seen as an indicator of the standard of living in a region.6
Since regions di¤er in size, aggregate measures of output, income, and disposable in-
come need to be normalized by an appropriate reference variable. Usually, total population
or total employment are used as a reference.
For income and disposable income, total population is the appropriate reference because
income is measured at the place of residence instead of at the workplace. In contrast, total
employment appears to be the more appropriate reference for data on production, because
both, GDP and the number of employed people refer to the workplace.7
3All data can be downloaded from:
http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/publ.asp.
4GNP data for German counties are not available. Moreover, there are no income data for other sectors.
5Previous studies on interregional risk sharing and scal federalism distinguish between the smoothing
e¤ects of di¤erent levels of the scal equalization system such as taxes, transfers, and grants (Sørensen
and Yosha, 1999, Buettner, 2002). Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze the composition of federal
government smoothing at the ne level of regional aggregation used in this paper because these data are not
available. Nevertheless, one still can compare incomes before and after redistribution of the scal sector,
i.e. income versus disposable income.
6O¢ cial statistics does not report data on consumption at the county level. Therefore, working with
disposable income data is the best we can do. It is well-known from other countries that even if consumption
data are available they are frequently measured imprecisely and noisily (ASY, 1996). Moreover, as argued
by Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001), over longer horizons one can expect consumption growth to
closely follow the growth rate of income after risk sharing. Unfortunately, o¢ cial statistics does not
provide regional price indices at the county level.
7Population or employment data disaggregated for age groups are not available for the whole time period
under study.
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This di¤erence between data referring to the place of residence and to the workplace
might cause problems in our analysis of interregional risk sharing because regions within
a country are integrated by commuter ows. If commuting linkages between regions are
not accounted for in the employed data, a properly specied risk sharing model needs to
isolate the smoothing e¤ects of commuting and suburbanization from other channels such
as capital market and federal government smoothing. A further problem associated with
the use of disaggregated county data is that the borders of German counties are determined
by political and historical rather than economic reasons.
For these reasons we aggregate counties to local labor market regions which are the
target areas for the most important regional policy program in Germany, the so called GRW
(German Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur). We
use data for 439 German counties to dene 271 labor market regions, so that center and
hinterland of labor markets are adequately integrated on the basis of commuter ows. Due
to this aggregation the employed data on GDP, income, and disposable income already
account for the most important commuting linkages between regions and we can express
all variables in terms of per capita as is usually done in the risk sharing literature.8
To account for the potential role of German-wide shocks (time-specic e¤ects) that
may create uninsurable output variability, we have formulated the data for each labor
market region relative to the German-wide aggregate. This normalization also accounts
for common changes in ination. The key variables in our study are the regions logarithmic
or percentage deviations from the national average per capita values of production, income,
and disposable income. To save on notation, we denote relative variables with lower-case
letters, so relative output per capita is gdp = log GDPGDP  , relative income is inc = log
INC
INC ;
and relative disposable income is dinc = log DINCDINC , whereas the variables indicated with
a star denote the population-weighted national average values. In the following, we use
the term relativeas equivalent to idiosyncratic.
These relative variables do not only reect the inuence of shocks but also include the
permanent heterogeneity among regions. This means that the levels of gdp, inc; and dinc
include the xed e¤ect of each region. In order to measure idiosyncratic shocks, we will
work with rst di¤erences of our key variables gdp; inc; and dinc which by construction
no longer include the xed e¤ects of the variables in levels. The rst di¤erences of the
relative variables measure the deviation of a regions growth rate from the average growth
rate in Germany as a whole.
The empirical analysis employs annual data in the period from 1995 to 2002. Data
8Since all our measures output, primary income, and disposable income are in per capita terms we
often omit per capita for the sake of brevity. Population data are reported by the Federal O¢ ce for
Building and Regional Planning.
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from earlier years are only available for GDP but not for primary and disposable income.
Thus, our database consists of a balanced panel of 271 regions observed over 8 years.9
3 The short-term stabilizing e¤ects of interregional risk sharing
In this section to what extent private markets and the public sector provide insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks to regional output is analyzed. As summarized by Asdrubali
and Kim (2004), most of the theoretical literature on risk sharing considers a world of
open endowment economies with complete markets lasting innite periods. Each economy
is populated by a representative risk-averse consumer who maximizes his expected utility
in the face of an exogenous stochastic output process. Standard time- and leisure-separable
utility functions imply that every representative agent will insure his future income stream
in any contingency. If markets are complete, agents can pool their risk and insure fully
against the idiosyncratic uncertainty in their resources. Consequently, one important em-
pirical implication of risk sharing theory is that consumption should not co-move with
idiosyncratic variables, such as regional output. Rather, changes in consumption should
move parallel to aggregate changes in consumption (given that preference shocks and mea-
surement error are absent).10
The study of risk sharing channels was introduced by ASY (1996) and adds to the
analysis the correlation between GDP and additional national accounts measures, such as
income, disposable income, and ultimately consumption. As discussed in the last section,
we can only work with data on disposable income because consumption data are not
available at the disaggregated regional level used in this paper. We follow the ideas of
ASY (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and consider the following identity of per
capita output, income, and disposable income:11:
gdpi = (gdpi   inci) + (inci   dinci) + (dinci) : (1)
In order to obtain a simple measure of smoothing from the identity, one manipulates it by
taking di¤erences and multiplying both sides by gdpi :
gdpi gdpi = (gdpi  inci)gdpi+(inci  dinci)gdpi+(dinci)gdpi: (2)
9The database only covers a rather short time period but one has to keep in mind that a richer database
is simply not available for reunied Germany.
10For more details on risk sharing theories we refer to Cochrane (1991), Sørensen and Yosha (1998),
Crucini (1999), and Crucini and Hess (2000).
11The decomposition suggested in the cited studies also includes consumption consi and reads as (in
logs): gdpi = gdpi   inci + inci   dinci + dinci   consi + consi:
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Finally, one takes expectations and arrives at the following decomposition of the cross-
sectional variance in gdp (see ASY, 1996, Sørensen and Yosha, 1998, and Mélitz and
Zumer, 1999 for further details):
var fgdpig= cov fgdpi;gdpi  incig (3)
+cov fgdpi;inci  dincig
+cov fgdpi;dincig :
Divide by the variance of gdpi to get
1 = C + G + U ; (4)
where C is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the regression of (gdpi  
inci) on gdpi: The dependent variable (gdpi   inci) reects changes in capital
income ows between regions (e.g. equity returns) and C is interpreted as the percentage
of smoothing of a GDP shock carried out by capital markets.12
Similarly, the coe¢ cient G is the slope in the regression of (inci   dinci) on
gdpi: The (inci  dinci) di¤erential measures the net change in scal transfers and
we can interpret G as the percentage of smoothing of a GDP shock carried out by the
federal government. Finally, U is the coe¢ cient in the regression of dinci on gdpi
and measures the amount not smoothed. In practice, the third regression needs not be
estimated because the  coe¢ cients sum to unity.
At the practical level, the typical parametric risk sharing regressions implied by the
variance decomposition method are specied as panel regressions and can be summarized
as follows (all variables are in stacked form):
gdp inc= Cgdp+ u1 (5)
inc dinc= Ggdp+ u2;
whereas C and G measure the average degree of capital market and federal government
smoothing, respectively. The  coe¢ cients will be weighted averages of the year-by-year
cross-sectional regressions (see ASY, 1996, footnote 5). In both regressions, the right-hand
side variable is the idiosyncratic shock to output and the slope parameters measure the
percentage of shocks to output which are absorbed at each level of smoothing. Full risk
12One has to keep in mind that the gdp  inc di¤erential also captures retained earnings. There are no
data available which can be used to disentangle the e¤ects. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) argue
that retained earnings do not alter the economic interpretation of capital market risk sharing substantially
because retained earnings reect an investment that contributes to dividends in the future.
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sharing is present if C and G sum to unity.
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This paper suggests an alternative method of analyzing risk sharing which is based
on nonparametric density estimation as proposed by Quah (1997) in the context of con-
vergence studies. Our basic idea is to combine ASYs (1996) regression specication as
summarized in (5) and Quahs (1997) distribution dynamics approach.
Quahs original approach is concerned with mapping whole distributions sequentially
in time. This procedure will turn out to be especially useful in estimating the long-term
redistributive e¤ects of interregional risk sharing and is introduced in more detail in the
next section. In this section, we suggest a slight modication of Quahs dynamic approach
to analyze the short-term stabilizing e¤ects of risk sharing.
By estimating the conditional densities f(gdp incjgdp) and f(inc dincjgdp)
we can test if shocks to regional output are transmitted to shocks to income and disposable
income. This means that instead of mapping the distributions of single variables (gdp; inc;
and dinc) sequentially in time,14 we estimate the (contemporaneous) conditional densities
of variables in rst di¤erences. These densities show the likelihood of changes in private
factor income ows (or net scal transfers, respectively) given that a region is subject to
an idiosyncratic shock to its production. In a nutshell, such analysis is the nonparametric
equivalent à la Quah (1997) to the parametric risk sharing regressions as displayed in (5).
To compare the results obtained with our method to those of linear techniques we will also
perform a simple regression-based risk sharing analysis.
The conditional densities f(gdp   incjgdp) and f(inc   dincjgdp) are es-
timated using adaptive kernel techniques (Silverman, 1986, Pagan and Ullah, 1999).15
We briey explain how to estimate the conditional densities using the density f(gdp  
incjgdp) as an example. First, we have to estimate the joint density of (gdp inc)
and gdp using adaptive kernel techniques. Then, we compute the marginal density of
gdp by integrating over (gdp  inc). The ratio of the joint density to the marginal
density provides the estimate of f(gdp incjgdp):
13This can be seen more clearly by rewriting the rst regression gdp   inc = Cgdp + u1 as
inc = (1   C)gdp + u1: If C equals 1, income does not co-move with output. Similarly, if full risk
sharing is achieved at the federal government level, dinc should not co-move with gdp. As in previous
studies, we do not impose any restrictions on the estimated coe¢ cients.
14This will be done in the next section.
15Adaptive estimators with a varying rather than xed bandwidth have the desirable e¤ect of separating
di¤erent modes of the density more clearly. The adaptive kernel estimator adapts to the sparseness of
the data by varying the bandwidth inversely with the density. This means that a broader bandwidth is
used for observations located in regions with low density, and vice versa. Thus, adaptive estimators are
able to recover more details of the density where data concentrate because the window width decreases in
those regions while it increases in areas of only low data densities. Silvermans (1986, Section 3.4.2) rule
of thumb is used to determine the bandwidth of the pilot density estimate in the two-step adaptive kernel
estimation. All computations are performed using MATLAB.
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Figure 1: Contour plot of f(gdp incjgdp) (capital market smoothing of idiosyncratic
output shocks)
Figures 1 and 2 show the contour plots of the surface of the conditional densities
f(gdp   incjgdp) and f(inc   dincjgdp) which were estimated using pooled
data for all years (1897 observations). The thin lines in Figures 1 and 2 connect points
at the same density on the three-dimensional graph of the conditional densities (output
omitted). The displayed regression lines will be explained later.
To illustrate how to interpret the gures, we can consider the conditional density
f(gdp  incjgdp) as an example (Figure 1). If all mass of this density were concen-
trated only parallel to thegdp axis at a value of 0 for (gdp inc); idiosyncratic output
shocks would not be insured at all. Such density shape would indicate that given that a
region has a certain output shock, there would be a high likelihood that this shock were
perfectly transmitted to a change in income of similar magnitude. Risk sharing would be
absent because there would be no adjustment in net factor income ows between regions
(gdp inc) in response to an idiosyncratic output shock gdp. In other words, there
would be no di¤erence between the change in relative output and the change in relative
income, regardless of the size of shocks to output.
In contrast, perfect risk sharing already at the capital market level manifests itself in
the kernel if most probability mass were concentrated around the 45-diagonal. In this case,
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Figure 2: Contour plot of f(inc dincjgdp) (federal government smoothing of idio-
syncratic output shocks)
relative income would not co-move with relative output. To examine the smoothing e¤ects
of the federal government, the shape of the conditional density f(inc dincjgdp) as
displayed in Figure 2 is interpreted analogously.
Figure 1 provides strong evidence of almost complete risk sharing after capital market
smoothing. Most of the mass of the conditional density is concentrated around the main
diagonal which indicates that shocks to regional production have no substantial inuence
on changes in income. This means that shocks to output gdp induce a change in factor
income ows (gdp inc) in the same direction and of similar magnitude. However, the
shape of the density also suggests that large positive or negative output shocks are partly
transmitted to changes in income.16 This visual impression will be conrmed below.
By sharp contrast, there is almost no evidence for a smoothing e¤ect of the federal
government (Figure 2). Since the mass of the conditional density f(inc dincjgdp)
is concentrated parallel to the gdp axis there is no evidence for an additional insurance
e¤ect of the public sector. In other words, shocks to regional output gdp do not induce
a change in net scal transfers (inc dinc):
16With (absolutely) large shocks we mean those values of gdp which are close to the left or right
boundary of the grid interval.
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Table 1: OLS estimates of risk sharing channels (percent)
1996-2002
Capital markets (C) 0.937 (0.007)
Federal government (G) -0.019 (0.005)
Not smoothed (U ) 0.082
1
Percentage of shocks to Gross Domestic Product absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Number of observations: 1897.
1Calculated as 1  C   G
In order to test if these strong results are conrmed by a parametric regression analysis,
we also estimate the risk sharing regressions (5). If C is estimated close to 1 and G close
to zero (or insignicant), we would obtain a similar pattern of almost complete risk sharing
after capital market smoothing and virtually no risk sharing after federal government
smoothing.
Indeed, this is the pattern found in the data (see Table 1). While a simple OLS re-
gression yields an estimate of C = 0:937; the estimated coe¢ cient for G is found to be
negative ( 0:019).17 The results of this estimation indicate that only 8% of idiosyncratic
output shocks are not smoothed after both channels of risk sharing. The federal govern-
ment, however, is found to have a (slight) destabilizing function. Hence, the results of the
parametric regression analysis are well in line with our nonparametric density analysis.
The examination of Figure 1 suggests that a parametric regression approach possi-
bly hides important information which could be detected in a nonparametric regression
framework. Fortunately, the estimated conditional densities f(gdp   incjgdp) and
f(inc dincjgdp) already incorporate a simple nonparametric regression. We simply
have to multiply the estimated conditional densities with the grid points at which the
density was evaluated.18
17Both coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level. Controlling for region-specic
xed-e¤ects in the idiosyncratic growth rates by removing region-specic means from all variables has close
to no inuence on the estimation results obtained with plain OLS.
18The same equi-spaced grid is used on both axis. A deeper nonparametric regression analysis (e.g. local
polynomial regression or average derivative estimation) is beyond the scope of this paper. Such analysis
could shed more light on the exact nature of the nonlinearities detected with our simple nonparametric
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In order to facilitate a comparison of a) the nonparametric conditional density ap-
proach, b) the parametric regression approach, and c) the nonparametric regression ap-
proach, we display both regression lines in the same graph as the conditional densities.
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the nonparametric regression indeed reveals some
nonlinearities which cannot be detected with the linear model. The shape of the nonpara-
metric regression indicates that moderate risks are almost completely insured. However,
large positive or negative shocks on the grid interval are partly transmitted to changes in
income. This pattern indicates that these risks are harder to insure on the capital market
than small risks.
The shape of the conditional density and the nonparametric regression line show the
advantage of the nonparametric approach suggested in this paper. As argued by Danny
Quah in the context of convergence studies, by focusing on the average behavior of a repre-
sentative region, a linear regression model potentially suppresses important distributional
patterns the researcher is interested in (see the arguments in Quah, 1996a, 1997). Our
results suggest that this problem may also apply for interregional risk sharing studies. In
our application, the linear regression for capital market smoothing is atter than the non-
parametric regression. Hence, the linear framework overstates the degree of risk sharing
for those risks which are measured on the grid interval.
For federal government smoothing (Figure 2), however, the nonparametric regression
is not substantially di¤erent from the linear regression line.
That much is certain, the most important feature is that both the nonparametric as well
as the parametric approach suggest a consistent result concerning short-term interregional
risk sharing: While private markets provide almost complete insurance against shocks, the
federal government does not contribute to a stabilization of regional incomes. According to
the results of our estimation, scal transfers in reunied Germany can hardly be justied
with reference to a potential stabilizing e¤ect on regional incomes. Such insurance e¤ect
cannot be found in the data.
However, as discussed in the Introduction, scal transfers are not only intended for
stabilization, but mainly for long-term redistribution. We argued that such redistribution
can also be interpreted as a kind of risk sharing: Rather than being concerned with the
smoothing of idiosyncratic shocks, the public sector can provide a smoothing of permanent
heterogeneity among regions. In order to analyze if scal transfers achieve a long-term
reduction of regional disparities by systematic redistribution of incomes, we analyze the
distribution dynamics of relative output, income, and disposable income. In contrast to
the short-term risk sharing analysis performed in this section, a long-term analysis of risk
regression, which is motivated by Quahs distribution dynamics approach.
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sharing is concerned with the levels of relative variables rather than their rst di¤erences.
4 The long-term redistributive e¤ects of interregional risk sharing
In this section we analyze to what extent the public sector reduces long-term di¤erences
in the relative position of a region, reecting its economic development relative to the
national average. In other words, we provide evidence whether long-term di¤erences in
relative production are also reected in long-term di¤erences in income and disposable
income. To do so, we adopt the distribution dynamics approach to economic convergence
which was proposed by Quah (1997).
In a rst step, we estimate a probability model of transitions which captures a dis-
tributions law of motion. This means that we examine how a given individual of the
distribution of gdp; inc; and dinc at time t transits to another part of the distribution by
the time t+  : In a second step, we follow recent developments in the growth convergence
literature (Johnson, 2000, 2005) and calculate the densities of the implied ergodic distri-
butions on the basis of the estimated distributional dynamics in a continuous framework.
As explained below, a comparison of the ergodic densities of gdp; inc and dinc allows one
to assess the degree of (level) smoothing achieved by private and scal institutions.
4.1 Estimating distribution dynamics and the implied ergodic density
One possibility of estimating transition probabilities is to discretize the state space and
then count the observed transitions out of and into distinct discrete cells of a Markov
transition probability matrix (Quah, 1993). However, Bulli (2001) has shown that an
arbitrary discretization of the state space alters the probabilistic properties of the data. A
better approach is to use no discretization but instead to allow the number of cells of the
Markov transition probability matrix to tend to innity (Quah, 1997). In this continuous
case, the transition probability matrix becomes a stochastic kernel. Such a kernel is
a huge non-negative matrix whose rows sum to unity, satisfying regularity conditions to
ensure that a limiting distribution exists (Quah, 2001).
To estimate the transition dynamics of gdp; inc; and dinc in a continuous framework,
we suppose that the distribution of a variable x can be described by the density function
ft(x), where x is variously gdp; inc; and dinc:19 In general, this distribution will evolve
over time so that the density prevailing at time t+  for  > 0 is ft+ (x): Assuming that
the process describing the evolution of the distribution is time-invariant and rst-order
Markov, the relationship between the two densities can be written as
ft+ (z) =
Z 1
0
g (zjx)ft(x)dx; (6)
19This simplied presentation of Quahs (1997) methodology was proposed by Johnson (2000, 2005).
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where g (zjx) is the  period ahead density of z conditional on x. For example, z could
be relative GDP in 2002 and x the same variable in 1995. The transition probabilities
g (zjx) encode all information about the evolution of the sequence of distributions over
time and map the distribution from period t to period t+  .
Similar to the last section, the stochastic kernel g (zjx) is a conditional density. How-
ever, there is an important di¤erence between the conditional densities g (zjx) for gdp; inc;
and dinc and the conditional densities f(gdp incjgdp) and f(inc dincjgdp):
The former densities map a single variable sequentially in time. This means that the kernel
g (zjx) shows the probability that a given region transits to a certain state of relative GDP
(income, disposable income) given that it is in a certain state of relative GDP (income,
disposable income) in the starting period.
The estimated transition probability kernel g (zjx) describes the distributions law
of motion. If one assumes that this law of motion is stable over time, the transition
probabilities can be projected further into the future, to calculate the implied stationary
(or ergodic) distribution. While actual densities at a given point in time may reect a
(historical) disequilibrium due to structural shocks in the past, the ergodic density shows
a future equilibrium in the absence of structural changes. An analysis of the long-term
properties of risk sharing is therefore concerned with the ergodic rather than actual point-
in-time densities.
Given an estimate for g (zjx); the implied long-run density f1(z); given that it exists,
is the solution to
f1(z) =
Z 1
0
g (zjx)f1(x)dx: (7)
We suggest two methods to solve for the ergodic density, f1(z) = f1(x): An intuitive ap-
proach is to multiply the transition probability kernel g (zjx) multiple times by itself until
the density has converged, which means, until all rows of the transition probability kernel
are equal. Using this iterative procedure, observed transition probabilities are projected
further into the future.
The second way is related to an eigenvector and eigenvalue problem. Johnson (2005)
has shown that the stationary distribution can be represented as an eigenvector of g (zjx)
corresponding to the eigenvector one.20 We checked that both approaches yield the same
20For an elaborate presentation of this idea see the webappendix of Johnson (2005), downloadable
from http://irving.vassar.edu/faculty/pj/pj.htm. The author explains how to solve numerically
for f1(z) =
bZ
a
g (zjx)f1(x)dx; where a and b dene the interval where the density is evaluated. In the
numerical implementation, the stochastic transition probability kernel g (zjx) is estimated as a p p ma-
trix Q; where p is the number of grid points at which the conditional density is evaluated. If the largest
eigenvalue of this matrix is unity then the Markov chain is ergodic. The left eigenvector  corresponding
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result.
Before introducing the economic interpretation of the ergodic densities of gdp, inc; and
dinc it is important to note that the limiting distribution is, by construction, independent
of initial conditions. This property becomes evident if one recalls that the ergodic density
can be calculated by multiplying the distributions law of motion multiple times by itself.
If there are su¢ cient iterations the inuence of the starting positions of particular regions
becomes more and more negligible.
Keeping this important property in mind, one can interpret the ergodic density from
the perspective of a single region. The underlying assumption of the ergodic density is that
a single region has moved many times between the states of the Markov chain according
to the unchanged law of motion g (zjx). By construction, the ergodic density shows how
often the region realizes the distinct states, asymptotically independent of the starting
position of the particular region. This means that for a single region, the ergodic density
shows the likelihood of certain outcomes.
For example, if the density of the ergodic distribution of one of our relative variables is
uni-modal with a peak at 0 (in logs), there is a very high likelihood that a region realizes
the average outcome. In other words, such pattern of the ergodic density would imply
that in the long run the likelihood is highest that a region becomes one with an average
outcome.
Besides the number of distinct peaks, one also has to examine the dispersion of the
ergodic density. If the dispersion is small it is unlikely that extreme values are realized.
By contrast, a large standard deviation indicates a pronounced variation.
A comparison of the implied long-run distributions of relative output, income, and
disposable income allows one to assess the extent of smoothing achieved by private and
public interregional transfers. One could also say that the ergodic distributions show the
riskof becoming a poor or rich region in terms of gdp; inc; and dinc: To illustrate this,
consider an extreme case. If regions were not integrated by factor movements and if there
were no scal transfer system, regions would be completely isolated and there would be
no interregional risk sharing. In such a setting, di¤erences in production would be fully
mirrored in both, income as well as disposable income. Consequently, the shape of the
ergodic densities of gdp; inc; and dinc would be equal. By contrast, if private institutions
absorb di¤erences in regional production and if there is signicant redistribution of regional
incomes by the public sector, the long-run distributions of output, income, and disposable
income will di¤er.
In our methodological framework of distribution dynamics one nds evidence for a
to this eigenvalue has the property  = Q and  is the implied ergodic density.
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reduction of disparities achieved by risk sharing if the ergodic density of relative income
has smaller dispersion than the ergodic density of relative output. Similarly, the extent of
redistribution achieved by the federal government is revealed by the shape of the ergodic
density of dinc in comparison to inc: The former density should have a smaller dispersion
than the latter.
If there is a large cross-section of regions, the ergodic densities also have a cross-
sectional interpretation. If it is assumed that the distribution of a cross-section of regions
has evolved for a very long time according to the unchanged law of motion g (zjx), the
inuence of the starting positions of di¤erent regions will have vanished. In such a setting,
the ergodic density shows the shape of the distribution if past dynamics continue operating
unchanged in the future.
For example, suppose that the ergodic density of the relative income variable turns out
to be bi-modal; one peak corresponds to a high relative income and the other one to a low
income. This pattern would imply that in the long run there are both, relatively rich as
well as poor regions in the cross-section. Hence, one would nd evidence for the existence
of inequality in the long run which usually is referred to as convergence clubs.
4.2 Estimation results
The estimated distribution dynamics of gdp; inc; and dinc are based on one-year transitions
taking place between 1995 and 2002. This means that we pool the observed transitions
1995-1996, 1996-1997 and so on. The use of annual transitions instead of longer time
intervals is strongly recommended by Quah because taking transition steps with long time
intervals instead of annual frequencies is likely to be correspondingly noisy, with even
fewer observations informing the estimate(Quah, 2001, p. 308). The sample consists of
1897 observations (271 labor market regions multiplied by 7 observed transitions).
Based on the estimated transition probability kernels g (zjx) (see equation (6)) we
calculate the ergodic densities of regional output, income, and disposable income (see
equation (7)).21 Figure 3 displays the estimation results. All densities have been normal-
ized so that the densities show the likelihood of a realization of gdp; inc; and dinc in the
grid interval.
4.2.1 GDP vs. income
Although private markets are not expected to provide substantial insurance against unfa-
vorable initial conditions, it is nevertheless instructive to compare the long-run distribu-
tions of output (gdp) and income (inc). As the literature points out, the capital market
21The transition probability kernels g (zjx) are conditional densities. To estimate these densities we can
use the same econometric toolkit as developed in the last section. Again, we use adaptive kernel techniques.
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Figure 3: Ergodic densities of relative output, income, and disposable income, calculated
on the basis of g1(zjx) for gdp; inc; and dinc (yearly transitions between 1995-2002)
may provide insurance, not only against transitory, but also against permanent shocks
(Becker and Ho¤mann, 2006).22 If stochastic shocks to output and income di¤er, it is well
possible that the long-run distribution of income is smoother than the output distribution.
Moreover, convergence in income may be expected to occur faster than convergence in
output, because convergence in income can be achieved by trade in nancial assets. By
contrast, convergence in output requires a ow of productive factors themselves.
Indeed, there is some evidence for these hypotheses. Both densities (gdp vs. inc) show
a three-peaked pattern. However, the peaks of the relative GDP distribution are located
at lower values than the peaks of the relative income distribution. For the relative GDP
distribution, the peaks correspond to 60%, 78%, and 93% of the German average while they
correspond to 67%, 89%, and 101% for the relative income distribution. This means that
a single region faces a higher likelihood of realizing a low value of relative production than
realizing a low value of relative income. Hence, the shapes of the ergodic densities suggest
that in the long run there are fewer di¤erences in regional income than in regional output.
22The methodology suggested in the last section cannot distinguish between transitory and permanent
shocks. Such distinction would require a cointegrated VAR framework. Due to the short time-period
spanned by our database for reunied Germany, a sophisticated analysis of the persistence of shocks is not
possible.
18
This pattern is consistent with a certain smoothing e¤ect of capital market linkages even if
the variables are formulated in levels rather than in rst di¤erences as in the last section.
To further illustrate that the income distribution is smoother than the GDP distribu-
tion we compare the standard deviations of the two distributions. Since there are no sample
observations of the ergodic density, one has to calculate the standard deviation directly
from the estimated density. The standard deviation of the relative output distribution is
0.246 while it is 0.190 for the relative income distribution.
Taking a cross-sectional perspective of economic convergence, the multimodal pattern
of both gdp and inc indicates that German labor market regions will not become equal
to one another in terms of output or income. Rather, there will be convergence clubs of
both regional output and income if the past dynamics of the regional distributions remain
unchanged. Since the market does not fully equalize regional income disparities, there can
be scope for further income smoothing provided by scal redistribution.
4.2.2 Income vs. disposable income
To analyze the long-term redistributive function of scal transfers we compare the ergodic
densities of income (inc) and disposable income (dinc).
As can be seen from Figure 3 , the long-run distribution of disposable income is strongly
uni-modal with a peak corresponding to 93% percent of the German average. This means
that becoming a region with a slightly below-average disposable income is associated with
the highest likelihood. Remarkably, in the long run, the probability that a region has
a disposable income smaller than about 0.75 times the German average (-0.3 in logs) is
e¤ectively zero.
The shape of the ergodic density of dinc suggests that German regions do not deviate
much from the average disposable income per capita. The gure clearly illustrates that
the ergodic distribution of disposable income has considerably smaller dispersion than the
income distribution. The standard deviation of the former is 0.098 while it is 0.190 for
the latter. These numbers show that the variance reduction achieved by the scal transfer
system is substantial. About half of the dispersion of the income distribution is smoothed
away by the federal government.
For the cross-section of regions we nd strong evidence of long-term convergence of
disposable income because there are no convergence clubs apparent.23 The persistent
polarization in regional output and income is not transmitted to the long-run distribution of
disposable income. This nding implies that scal redistribution strongly contributes to an
23The term convergenceshould not be interpreted as a dynamic catching-up process of poor regions.
Rather, convergence of disposable income only refers to a reduction of disparities through systematic
redistribution by the public sector.
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equalization of incomes among regions in reunied Germany. To put it di¤erently, income
smoothing by federal scal institutions is necessary to achieve a uni-modal distribution of
regional incomes.
On the side of the econometrics, the estimated shape of the densities of the long-run
distributions of gdp; inc; and dinc show the advantage of the nonparametric approach
proposed in this paper. Obviously, the distribution patterns are non-normal. A standard
parametric regression analysis could not detect the long-term polarization outcome in
gdp and inc: Therefore, this paper has shown that Quahs (1997) distribution dynamics
approach is not only a powerful framework to analyze GDP convergence or divergence
but it is also extremely useful to discriminate between the long-run outcomes of output,
income, and disposable income.
5 Discussion
Besides having provided new empirical evidence on interregional risk sharing in reunied
Germany, another contribution of this paper is to have introduced new empirical techniques
into the risk sharing literature inspired by established techniques originally proposed in the
growth econometrics literature. We think that the application of the distribution dynamics
approach in a risk sharing framework is an advance in itself and it would be interesting
to compare the results for Germany with other countries. In order to point out potential
drawbacks and opportunities of the distribution dynamics framework to other researchers,
we present a critical discussion of our analysis before we summarize our main results.
One caveat of our analysis is that we did not directly examine the e¤ects of labor
mobility on smoothing of GDP shocks. Interregional smoothing of earnings can be the
result of commuting across the borders of a region (ASY, 1996) and commuters income
may also make up a fraction of the smoothing e¤ect attributed to the capital market.
Therefore, it is an important task for future research to incorporate commuter ows in the
risk sharing framework, an issue which has gained only minor attention in the literature
so far.
Moreover, due to the short time period available for reunied Germany, we did not
examine the time-series properties of the data used. For other countries, however, longer
time series are available and researchers should carefully examine the persistence the data
display. The concept of distribution dynamics is only applicable if the employed relative
variables are stationary. In other words, if the absolute per capita levels of regional output,
income, and disposable income are integrated processes, one has to assume that there is a
cointegrating relationship between regional variables and the respective national average
values with cointegrating vector (1; 1): Only if there is such long-run relationship between
regional and aggregate variables, can one interpret the ergodic densities of relative variables
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also in terms of a cointegrating relationship, as we did in the present paper. By contrast,
if the relative data series are integrated processes, an ergodic density in the sense of a
long-run equilibrium simply does not exist because a non-stationary series is not ergodic.
Another important aspect is that our analysis does not account for spatial e¤ects.
Throughout the present paper the cross-sectional observations on regional output, income,
and disposable income were treated as if they represent a random sample, that is, a col-
lection of observations from independent and identically distributed random variables. In
reality, however, regional data often display a high degree of spatial autocorrelation as
well as various forms of spatial heterogeneity. Unfortunately, there is no study as of to-
day which explores the implications that spatial e¤ects can hold for the application of the
continuous variant of the distribution dynamics approach used in this paper.
Of course, there are alternative estimation strategies which could be used to overcome
the discussed limitations of the nonparametric distribution dynamics approach. For exam-
ple, there are both panel data and time-series models that can account for spatial inter-
dependence. The advantage of the approach pursued in the present paper comes about if
the distribution is not single-peaked and high moments have to be estimated for proper
inference. We fully agree with Rey and Devs (2006) call that a fruitful avenue of future
research is adopting a perspective where the outputs from the spatial econometric analysis
become inputs into a higher order study in which the dynamics of both the income distri-
bution and the level of spatial clustering are treated jointly. The methodological issues
on spatial regional income convergence examined in Rey (2001), Egger and Pfa¤ermayr
(2006), and Rey and Dev (2006) can have relevance for the study of interregional risk shar-
ing, especially the recent developments in the analysis of spatial -convergence. The cited
studies may serve as a starting point to develop a unied modelling strategy for spatial
dependence and the dynamics of the whole income distribution.
However, before adopting spatial econometric techniques to the issue of risk sharing, re-
searchers should extend existing theoretical models to directly incorporate spatial linkages
of capital, federal government, and credit market smoothing, so that testable empirical
implications can be derived from a sound theoretical basis. In growth theory, the connec-
tion between spatial econometric techniques and theoretical (structural) models including
spatial linkages is beginning to attract increased attention (see for example Fingleton and
López-Bazo, 2006). For the issue of risk sharing, we leave these interesting tasks to future
research.
6 Conclusion
This paper focused on two related questions: First, to what extent do private institutions
and the public sector provide insurance against idiosyncratic output shocks to individual
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regions? Second, to what extent do private institutions and the public sector reduce long-
term di¤erences in the relative position of a region reecting its economic development
relative to the national average?
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the aim of this study was not to draw conclusions
about whether the existing federal transfer system redistributes too much or too little.
Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze any negative incentive e¤ects
that can result from the scal transfer system. Instead, we were only interested in analyzing
the stabilizing e¤ects and predicting the long-term redistributive e¤ects of scal transfers
in reunied Germany.
Our empirical results suggest that private factor income ows provide almost complete
insurance against region-specic shocks. A co-movement of income and output is only
found for high and low idiosyncratic output risk. This pattern could not be detected
within a linear regression approach which, in our application, tends to overstate the degree
of insurance provided by private markets.
By sharp contrast, the federal government channel is not found to have a stabilizing
e¤ect on regional incomes. Rather than providing insurance against idiosyncratic shocks,
scal transfers in reunied Germany are mainly concerned with redistribution in favor of
depressed regions. The scal transfer system achieves a substantial reduction of long-term
disparities between regions. If past distribution dynamics continue operating unchanged
in the future, a uni-modal distribution of regional incomes will not be achieved without
redistribution by the public sector. These ndings imply that the public sector provides
insurance against that type of risk which cannot be completely insured on private markets:
The risk of being a permanently poor region.
Our paper shows that the patterns of short-term risk sharing (smoothing of shocks)
and long-term redistribution of the public sector (smoothing of di¤erences in levels) can
di¤er substantially. Under the current law in Germany, it is hard to argue that short-
term risk sharing is the main justication of the federal transfer mechanism. Though,
previous studies on interregional risk sharing argue that even a redistributive policy may
turn out to have stabilizing e¤ects. In the US, 13 percent of shocks to gross state product
are smoothed by the federal government (ASY, 1996). Using a similar approach as ASY
(1996) to estimate the smoothing of state-specic shocks to West German states from 1970
to 1997, Buettner (2002) nds that the share of shocks to state income absorbed by scal
ows is roughly at the same level as in the US. In reunied Germany, however, stabilization
is not a by-product of scal redistribution at all, at least at the disaggregated regional level
used in this paper.
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